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Executive Summary
This study evaluates the federal tax exemption
for credit unions. It reviews the industry’s
history, its unique exemption, the motivation
behind this tax treatment, the eroding case for
special treatment, the size of the tax break and
its effects on credit unions, their competitors,
and their members. President Bush has
recently named a prestigious commission on
tax reform to be chaired by former Senators
Connie Mack (R-FL) and John Breaux (D-
LA), so a fresh examination of the federal
credit union tax exemption is indeed timely.
Tax Loss to the Treasury
Credit unions are growing rapidly, and so
is the associated tax loss to the federal Trea-
sury caused by their exemption. Indeed, the
tax loss over the five-year period 2004-2008 is
estimated in this study to be $12.6 billion.
Extended over the typical ten-year federal
budget window, the tax loss reaches $31.3
billion. The size of the tax loss is substantially
higher than estimates prepared by govern-
ment arbiters including the Office of
Management and Budget or the Congres-
sional Budget Office.
Competitive Advantage:
A Study of the Federal
Tax Exemption for
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by John A. Tatom, Ph.D.
The Tax Exemption’s Original Justification
This tax exemption has existed for almost
70 years because of the original concept of
credit unions’ cooperative ownership. The
original legal “field of membership” restric-
tions on credit unions were designed to limit
their ability to compete by strictly defining
who could be a depositor and borrower from
a credit union, with the idea that credit
unions would use their tax advantage to serve
low-income borrowers and depositors. How-
ever, over time credit unions have avoided
most of the restrictions, and as a result they
have competed directly and successfully with
other financial institutions in many markets
with a major cost advantage, the tax exemp-
tion. Moreover, there is no solid evidence that
credit unions have turned the subsidy into
service for low-income people.
Who Benefits from the Tax Exemption?
Corroborated by other studies of credit
unions and banks, the direct and indirect
evidence gathered for this study shows that
the equity holders of credit unions receive the
tax saving as unusual returns. These unusual
returns do not show up as relatively high
dividends, however. Instead, they occur as
unusually large retained earnings accumulated
2as net worth in their credit unions. The sharehold-
ers’ extra income reinvested in the credit union
provides new capital that allows the credit union
to grow faster than other institutions.
There is some evidence that certain types of
loans have lower rates at credit unions, especially
for loans that have become less profitable and less
available at banks, such as auto loans. There is also
some evidence that part of the tax advantage is
absorbed by costs that are higher than they would
have been in a taxed, or more competitive, envi-
ronment.
Overall, however, the dominant effect of the
tax exemption is to boost the equity ratio. Over
the past ten years, credit unions have had an eq-
uity ratio — the ratio of equity to total assets —
that is more than 25 percent larger than that of
banks.
Of the 50 basis points in subsidy that the tax
exemption provides, at least 33 basis points accrue
to owners in the form of larger equity and larger
assets. Approximately 6 basis points may accrue to
credit union borrowers through lower interest
rates, and not more than 11 basis points are ab-
sorbed by higher labor costs. There is little or no
effect on deposit rates or other costs.
By giving a tax exemption to credit unions
while taxing their competitors — banks, thrifts
and finance companies, financial institutions that
offer the same consumer deposits and loans — the
federal government distorts the allocation of re-
sources. It promotes the employment of deposit
and credit resources in the tax-free credit union
sector at the expense of all these other financial
institutions.
Competitive Advantages Beyond the Exemption
Along with the tax exemption, a steady ero-
sion of limits on credit union membership has
allowed credit unions to grow much more rapidly
than banks, especially over the past two decades.
In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the
liberalization of membership rules, but the U.S.
Congress promptly passed new legislation overrid-
ing the court. As a result, credit unions have
rapidly consolidated, merged and broadened their
geographic markets, all the while maintaining
their tax exemptions. Thus, Congress created new
tensions by weakening the original case for tax
exemption.
Banks currently are subject to extensive costs
to insure that they are meeting the credit demands
of low-income borrowers. Credit unions were
excluded from these provisions because of the
presumption that they must be serving such con-
sumers. After all, their charters are rooted in
common bonds that seem to assume that credit
unions meet these requirements. But the evidence
shows that credit unions do not serve low- and
moderate-income people to any greater extent
than banks. For example, most credit unions have
an occupational bond that requires members to be
employed, often in industries with relatively high-
wage jobs.
Proposals for Reform
Today credit unions continue to grow faster
than banks, have little practical limitations on
membership, and make business loans that in-
creasingly have no limits on who can borrow, how
much or for what purpose. Even the limits that
Congress has imposed, as they otherwise removed
limits on credit union markets and competition,
have broad loopholes and remain under serious
challenge by the credit union industry.
Today the principal justification for the tax
exemption would seem to be that it already exists
and, therefore, removing it could adversely impact
thousands of institutions and their customers.
Under current law, as it is being enforced, there is
no good policy argument based on equity or effi-
ciency for maintaining the tax exemption. Some
analysts have argued that small institutions (under
$10 million in assets) should continue to be tax
exempt because of their special character and,
perhaps, innate inefficiencies. Notably, the corpo-
rate income tax already takes size into account by
taxing low-income firms at lower tax rates (15
percent, while larger firms pay rates that range
from 34 to 39 percent).
Removing the credit unions’ tax exemption
would create a more equitable tax system and help
level the playing field with other financial institu-
tions. It would also raise about $2 billion in tax
revenue each year, either directly from credit
unions or from more profitable and more highly
taxed banks, where some credit union deposits
and assets would migrate in a competitive market.
Finally, it would raise the rate of return on some
$65 billion of capital that is squirreled away in
credit unions, earning lower rates of return than
would be the case at taxpaying banks.
The unusually high equity ratio of credit
unions would be reduced; and management of
capital costs would make credit unions more effi-
cient, perhaps lowering operating costs and
interest rates on deposits and raising rates on
loans, at least in some markets. Credit unions
would be more subject to market control and
would manage risk and return more efficiently,
increasing the value of their franchises to their
owners, despite smaller relative size and slower
growth.
31 In March 2004, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Chairman Donald Powell repeated his recommendation that bank-like
“credit unions ought to pay taxes,” pointing to the rapid growth of credit unions aggressively competing against banks.  In the
same month, the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, William Thomas (R-CA), called for a greater examina-
tion of tax-preferred entities, mentioning credit unions as an example.
2 For example, see New Zealand Treasury (2000) and Department of Finance, Government of Ireland (1998) for discussions of
the identical problems in these countries and proposals to end the exemption of corporate (or company) income tax. The
Ireland paper also discusses moves in the European Union to promote neutrality by eliminating tax exemptions for credit
unions and their customers.  The distinguished free market Finance Minister Charlie McCreevy (2000), the recently appointed
EU Commissioner for Internal Markets, indicated support for the corporate tax exemption, but opposition to the broader tax
exemption of interest income at Irish credit unions.  However, he noted the continuing opposition of the EU Commission to
state aid to private sector activity and implies that the corporate exemption is precisely such aid. Other recent studies include
Bickley (2003), Florida Tax Watch (2003) and Chmura Economics and Analytics (2004).
3 The Supreme Court case was NCUA vs. First National Bank and Trust Co. (1998).
4 The author was in the audience when this exchange occurred.
Introduction
The competitive and legislative environment
of credit unions has changed dramatically in the
past several years and a key aspect, their exemp-
tion from the federal income tax, has come under
increasing scrutiny.1 Credit unions in the U.S. and
elsewhere have been free of federal income taxes
for a variety of related reasons, including their
cooperative organization and ownership structure,
their so-called common bond, and their mission
to provide services to small or relatively low-
income savers.
That status has come under increasing ques-
tion both in the U.S. and abroad, largely because
of increasing attention to the principle of neutral-
ity in taxation and the equity principle that calls
for a “level playing field” or “treating equals
equally.” 2 The special tax status of credit unions
has also been increasingly challenged because of
questions about the ability and commitment of
credit unions to serve low-income people. The
competitive and tax status of credit unions were
tested by a Supreme Court decision in February of
1998 that insisted credit unions enforce tight
“common bond” requirements in order to obtain
and maintain their charters and tax exemption.3
Congress reacted swiftly. Within six months Con-
gress had passed the Credit Union Membership
Access Act (CUMAA) which authorized the very
multiple-group fields of membership that the
Supreme Court had just invalidated.
While the issue of membership groups ap-
pears limited, it is the key restriction that analysts
had used to argue for the special regulatory and
tax status of credit unions. The irony is that
CUMAA indirectly removed the special status of
credit unions, but in their override of the Supreme
Court, Congress appeared to strongly endorse the
status quo, which includes the special tax status of
credit unions. Thus, there is an unresolved tension
in the regulatory and tax environment facing the
financial services industry. If nothing else, remov-
ing the special status of credit unions under
regulatory guidelines calls into question the re-
lated federal income tax exemption.
Yet recently the Secretary of the Treasury
pointedly implied that the issue will not be on the
table any time soon. In a question and answer
session at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s
Bank Structure Conference in May 2004, Secre-
tary Snow was asked if he thought the special tax
status of credit unions was fair, if and when it
would be reviewed and whether it would be al-
tered. He responded with a unqualified “No” to
the idea of reviewing the exemption.4
Whether challenges to the tax status of credit
unions can be so easily dismissed is doubtful, even
if officials would like to ignore the issue. But the
response does point to the intransigence of politi-
cal forces to challenge the status quo, especially
when it has political appeal enjoyed by the current
tax treatment of credit unions. Whether one fa-
vors or is opposed to the current tax treatment, a
sound understanding of its origins, history, and
effects on credit unions, their customers and their
competitors is essential for decisions to maintain
or to alter the existing preferential tax and regula-
tory treatment of credit unions.
Credit unions are among the most rapidly
growing financial firms in the country. This un-
usual growth could possibly be due to special tax
breaks or other subsidies, or perhaps simply be-
cause they play a unique or special role in the
economy. But in recent years, analysts have begun
to question the bases for special treatment of
credit unions and more research has begun to
point to adverse consequences of their special tax
treatment. This study reviews the historical basis
of the federal tax exemption of credit union in-
come and factors eroding its support. It also looks
at the consequences of the tax break and who
gains and who loses from credit unions’ tax ex-
empt status.
45 See Bickley (2004).
6 See Joint Committee on Taxation (2003).
7 Credit unions originated in the Raiffeisen banks started in 1854 in rural areas of the Rhine by Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen.
These were cooperative banks intended to serve farmers and were the first to have a field of membership and use the same
operating principles as today.  Such banks still exist with this name, and purpose, in Austria and several other European
countries. Cooperative banks for artisans date back to 1850 and purchasing cooperatives date back to 1844 when the Rochdale
Pioneers organized the first cooperative in Rochdale, England.  See Credit Union League of Hong Kong,
www.hkcreditunion.org. and Bickley (2003) for the historical information.
Large and Growing Tax Loss
The losses from the tax exemption are quite
large, according to several alternative estimates.
The U.S. Treasury estimates that taxing credit
unions would raise $1.24 billion in fiscal 2005,
according to Bickley (2003) who provides an
excellent overview of the issue of removing the
credit union exemption from federal income taxa-
tion.5 The U.S. Congress’ Joint Committee on
Taxation (JCT) estimates that the loss in federal
tax revenue is about $1.2 billion in 2004 and that
this will rise to $1.8 billion by 2008.6 A recent
study by Chmura Economics & Analytics (May
2004) indicates a much larger tax loss of $1.89
billion in 2002. The most recent comparable JCT
estimate for the fiscal 2002 tax loss is $0.9 billion.
The most recent estimates computed for this
study indicate that the tax loss is even larger,
about $2 billion in 2003 (calendar year), and $1.9
billion in 2002. Over the ten-year revenue estima-
tion period 2004 to 2013, the tax loss is expected
to be $31.3 billion.
Notably, large federal deficits in recent years
require serious attention to both the spending and
the revenue sides of the budget. The sizable tax
revenue loss from the $31.3 billion tax exemption
granted credit unions warrants more attention
than normal in this environment, especially since
credit unions and the tax expenditure are growing
rapidly. Where does this tax loss go? Is it received
indirectly by credit union savers in higher divi-
dends or interest? Do credit union borrowers
receive the tax savings in the form of lower interest
rates? Or are wages higher at credit unions? Ac-
cording to the analysis in this study, the most
likely result is that the equity holders of credit
unions receive the tax saving as unusual returns.
These unusual returns do not show up as relatively
high dividends, however. Instead, they occur as
unusually large retained earnings accumulated as
net worth in their credit unions. The shareholders’
extra income reinvested in the credit union pro-
vides new capital that allows the credit union to
grow faster than other institutions.
For many years, both in this country and
abroad, industry leaders, policy analysts and
policymakers have debated whether credit unions
play some special role in the economy and
whether they deserve special tax treatment.
Spurred by the Supreme Court challenge (1998)
to the special treatment, Congress passed
CUMAA. This act enhanced the availability of the
tax subsidy for credit unions because it widened
the field of membership, the group of people that
could be customers of a credit union. The looser
field of membership requirements also allowed
credit unions, especially large ones, to expand
their growth opportunities, reinforcing the com-
petitive advantage obtained from their tax
advantages. The ability to pass on their tax saving
to broader customer bases, in the form of lower
interest rates on loans, higher rates on deposits or
increased retained earnings growth, warrants a
review of the size of the tax subsidy and its inci-
dence, or where the tax saving goes. The study will
detail the effects of the tax subsidy on the pricing
and/or income advantages accruing to credit
unions and its effects on growth, especially for
relatively large credit unions. The changing credit
union structure has allowed credit unions to ex-
tend their competitive advantages to broader
groups facilitating increased competition and
market share growth, especially for large institu-
tions. Estimates of the tax loss and its effects on
credit union profitability, service prices and cost
structure are most useful in assessing the benefit
and cost of the federal income tax exemption.
I. The Basis of Tax Exemption—
The Common Bond and How
It Is Changing
The first U.S. credit union was chartered in
1909 by the state of New Hampshire.7 The federal
income tax (and federal chartering of credit
unions) came later, and credit unions were not
exempt under the new tax. An administrative
ruling by the Attorney General in 1917 exempted
credit unions from federal taxation. Federal char-
tering of credit unions began under the Federal
Credit Union Act of 1934, but federally chartered
credit unions were not exempted from federal and
state income taxation until the act was amended
in 1937. The amendment was based on the ser-
vices of credit unions to their members, according
to Bickley (2003). Since 1937, both federal and
state-chartered credit unions have been exempt
58 This information is drawn from a survey provided by the Office of the General Counsel, Credit Union National Association,
2004.
9 See Congressional Budget Office (March 2003), p. 218.
from federal income taxation and federally char-
tered institutions have been exempt from all
federal and state taxation. States have generally
followed the federal lead.
Only five states subject state-chartered credit
unions to their state corporate income tax: Cali-
fornia, Indiana, Iowa, Oklahoma and Oregon.
Iowa’s 12-percent rate is the nation’s highest; the
other four states have more typical rates that vary
from 6.0 to 8.84 percent. New Hampshire im-
poses two taxes, a business profits and a business
enterprise tax, that are similar to an income tax
and combine for a maximum tax of 9.25 percent.
Several more states impose limited tax levies such
as franchise taxes on their state-chartered credit
unions. About half of all states subject state-char-
tered credit unions to sales or use taxes and
personal property taxes, and most states impose
real property taxes as well.8 These taxes are all
much smaller than the federal income tax, but
even these small differences could affect the per-
formance of federal and state-chartered credit
unions.
The key factor is that credit unions are ex-
empt from federal income taxation and have been
for many years. Savings and loan associations were
also exempt from federal income taxation until
1951 when their exemption, granted under the
same tax law provision as that for credit unions,
was removed. Congress eliminated the exemptions
for savings and loans and mutual savings banks on
the grounds that they were similar to profit-seek-
ing corporations.9 Since then, large credit unions
have come to resemble large thrifts and banks. It
should be noted again that while all credit unions
are exempt from federal income taxes, only feder-
ally chartered credit unions are exempt from all
taxes at the state level as well. State-chartered
credit unions are not exempt from state income
taxes, franchise taxes, property or sales taxes in
many states. Thus, one way to assess the effect of
tax exemption is to compare federal and state-
chartered credit unions.
The rationale for tax exemption originates in
the uniqueness of the “common bond” under
which credit unions are chartered. The common
bond determines a “field of membership” from
which a credit union may draw and the members
are the owners of the accumulated reserves (or
retained earnings) in proportion to their shares of
deposits. Only members may hold deposits or
receive loans from the credit union, though credit
unions also make loans to other credit unions and
credit union service corporations and they can
accept deposits and make loans to non-members
under some restricted conditions. Such loans and
deposits are quite small however. Thus, a credit
union is a nonprofit financial cooperative for tax
purposes, though they are often organized as cor-
porations for legal reasons. Profit is reinvested or
paid to depositors and taxed as interest under the
individual income tax. The principal functions of
credit unions are to accept deposits (called shares,
and actually equity shares for most of the usual
purposes) from their members and to make loans
to them or investments. Shares include checkable
share draft accounts, regular savings shares, money
market, certificates of deposit and IRA or Keogh
accounts. The principal loans to members, ranked
by size, are new and used vehicle loans, first mort-
gage loans, other real estate loans, and credit card
loans. The motto of credit unions summarizes
their original goals, “not for profit, not for charity,
but for service.” Of course credit unions learned
long ago that more service can come from operat-
ing efficiently, earning profits and expanding their
capital base.
Regulators allow four categories of common
bonds. The earliest and most common types are
the single occupational or single associational bonds.
The first limits the group to employees of the
same firm or workers in a single occupational class
who may work for many different employers. The
second group includes members of a social or civic
group, which shares common loyalties, mutual
interests or mutual benefits and which provides
activities where members have contact with one
another. Since 1982, when failing credit unions
were perceived as being unduly risky because of
the heavy risk concentration created by the narrow
common bond criteria, regulators have created
broader more diverse common bonds. The third
type today, the multiple common bond, allows
groups with different occupational or associational
bonds to join together. This has been the most
controversial because it essentially provides little
or no limit to membership; indeed this was the
issue in NCUA vs. First National Bank and Trust
Co. (1998). The fourth category is the community
common bond, which limits the field of member-
ship to people who reside in or are employed in a
well-defined local community. This is potentially a
bond with even less meaningful restriction than
the multiple bond because it has been used to
encompass such a broad geographic area and open
group. Community charters are the fastest grow-
6ing segment of the credit union industry. One can
easily imagine a U.S. credit union restricted to
residents of the U.S., little more restricted than a
nationwide bank. Indeed, on July 29, 2004, the
National Credit Union Administration approved a
community charter for the LA Financial Credit
Union, which has a field of membership of all
10.1 million residents of Los Angeles County.
The common bond is unique to credit
unions. It was intended to restrict who can be a
member and benefit from the services of the credit
union, but it also limits the credit union from
developing potentially more profitable relation-
ships with depositors or borrowers. Its cooperative
nature and the restrictions on its business are both
reasons given for the tax exemption. The occupa-
tional and associational bonds had always
provided the support for the notion that a credit
union is a cooperative effort by people of more
limited means, or perhaps low income, to make
available financial services to which they would
otherwise either have no access or face prohibitive
cost.
Many studies have questioned whether even
these more traditionally chartered firms really live
up to that standard. For example, Jacob, Bush and
Immergluck (2002) have shown that the incomes
of credit union members are little different from
the incomes of customers of banks and thrifts.
This should not be surprising, especially in the
case of occupational credit unions, because the
members are employed, often in higher wage
sectors such as teachers or trade union members.
The largest credit unions are those for the airlines,
aircraft production, teachers, government workers
and unions. Credit unions focus on consumer
banking, while most banks depend more on busi-
ness customers, but there is little reason to think
that credit unions are serving a social purpose
not served by other readily available financial
institutions. The basis then for special tax treat-
ment could not rest on the notion that credit
unions serve a disadvantaged class, though this
was the original motivation and basis of the tax
exemption.
The introduction and increasing number of
multiple bond charters beginning in 1982 pro-
vided a more important challenge to the notion
that the credit unions are damaged by their social
objective of serving a particular field of member-
ship. Until then, potential members were arguably
a more limited and perhaps unprofitable group to
serve than the potential depositors or borrowers
from banks, thrifts or other financial institutions.
Banking organizations and their trade groups,
which have to compete with the special treatment
accorded credit unions, campaigned to end the
competitive advantage of tax-exempt credit
unions. Since the early-1980s, they have
strenuously objected to the liberalization of
the limits imposed by the common bond, the
legal limits that had justified the credit union
tax break earlier.
Chmura (2004) suggests that the “moral
hazard” of borrowers, essentially the risk that
borrowers will engage in risky activities that make
it more likely they will default on loans, was
boosted by having credit unions that serve pre-
dominately people of small means. This greater
risk might have justified tax exemption as a cost
offset in the past, according to Chmura. One
could add a greater “adverse selection” problem as
such a basis. Adverse selection means that the
highest risk borrowers are more likely to get loans
than low risk borrowers. It occurs because institu-
tions that face default risk will price loans to
compensate for the risk and these higher interest
rates, in turn, will discourage low risk borrowers
from borrowing. This could be another factor that
would worsen default rates at credit unions if they
focus on high risk, relatively poor consumers, and
are prohibited from lending to a broader class of
borrowers that might include safer borrowers, in
particular business borrowers.
The growing evidence that members of credit
unions are no different from people who are bank
customers would lead one to reject this rationale.
Chmura points out that deposit insurance would
protect depositors from the risk of their credit
union making high risk loans to relatively poorer
people, so that the introduction of deposit insur-
ance for credit unions in 1970 eliminated unusual
moral hazard as a rationale. Actually business
loans are riskier than consumer loans (real estate,
vehicle and other loans) so that the higher default
risk—deposit insurance relation would apply
more to banks than to credit unions, if in fact
credit unions were more constrained.
Another reason that is not mentioned in the
literature on the common bond is that credit
unions, by having a narrow field of membership,
might face greater systemic risks associated with
concentration of assets among similarly situated
borrowers. For example some of the largest credit
unions serve employees of airlines, such as United,
Delta, U.S. Air, and the plane manufacturing firm,
the Boeing Corporation. Industry difficulties due,
for example, to downturn in the economy, shifts in
demand patterns or other industry specific prob-
lems make credit unions likely to face greater
industrial or geographic risk than banks in the
same areas. Because of a mandated lack of diversi-
fication possibilities, credit unions might have a
disadvantage compared with banks. Again, how-
710 The personal consumption deflator (2000 = 100) is used to deflate both asset measures.
11 Chmura (2004) points out that this relatively slower growth may suggest that CUMAA did not augment the tax break for
credit union and foster their faster growth.  The Chmura study suggests that the evidence on relative growth of credit unions is
mixed because the average size credit union has been growing faster than that of banks since 1998.  This is an overstatement,
however.  The faster growth of the average size simply reflects a faster pace of consolidation in the number of credit unions
compared with banks. This faster pace of consolidation more than offsets the slowdown in the relative growth rate of credit
union assets relative to those at banks. Both banks and credit unions have seen booming growth in their assets while their
numbers are declining.  Both sectors have been consolidating since the 1980s.
12 See, Gunther and Moore (2004a) for an example of such a cautious study.
13 CUMAA limits the size of business loans to 12.25 percent of total assets, but Small Business Administration lending and
business loans under $50,000 are not capped at all. According to NCUA data, in 2003 member business loans outstanding
were only $8.9 billion, or 2.4 percent of total loans and 1.5percent of total assets.  Such loans are expected to become a larger
share of assets, especially at large credit unions.
ever, the existence of insurance is a more effective
remedy against such risk than is a tax exemption.
Notably, the insurer and regulator, the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA) has an
incentive to reduce these concentration risks by
allowing multiple bond institutions, and this, in
fact, has occurred widely since the 1980s. Before
that, such industry-specific and geographically
concentrated risks resulted in higher failure rates of
credit unions. While diversification reduces risk to
the insurance fund, it weakens the justification for
a tax exemption based on perceived disadvantages
of cooperative enterprise or higher risk.
Today the principal justification for the tax
exemption would seem to be that it already exists
and, therefore, removing it could adversely impact
thousands of institutions and their customers.
And these institutions and customers are per-
ceived, incorrectly, to be relatively lower income
or associated with the economic security and
progress of lower income people. This is a strong
argument in terms of practical politics, but it is
not supported by fact and is an egregious violation
of one of the most fundamental principles of
sound tax policy, neutrality. By having such tax
discrimination, the exempt sector will be larger
than it would otherwise be and more inefficient
than the taxed sector, diverting scarce credit re-
sources, in this case, to lower value uses.
The key issue raised by federal income tax
exemption is tax neutrality, a fundamental prin-
ciple of taxation. Taxing some financial
institutions that offer the same consumer deposits
and loans while not taxing others, in particular
credit unions, distorts the allocation of resources.
It promotes the employment of deposit and credit
resources in the tax-free credit union sector at the
expense of their competitors, banks, thrift institu-
tions and finance companies.
 II. The Growth of Credit Unions
Credit unions have grown much faster than
banks, a fact that often is cited as evidence of their
tax advantage. Figure 1 shows the growth rate of
credit union and bank real assets since 1973. The
excess growth rate at credit unions was especially
noteworthy until 1993, but not as apparent since
then. Real assets are used because inflation influ-
ences the growth rates and was much higher in the
1970s and 1980s when credit union growth was
also relatively high.10 From 1973 to 1993, real
credit union assets expanded at a 6.4 percent an-
nual average rate, almost 4 percentage points
faster than the 2.5 percent growth rate of real
bank assets. Since then, the growth rate of real
credit union assets slowed slightly to 6 percent,
while real bank asset growth accelerated to 5.2
percent. While credit union asset growth contin-
ued to outstrip that of banks, it was only about
0.8 percentage points faster.11
Comparing credit unions with banks must be
done with caution.12 Banks, especially large ones,
have a more diverse base of depositors and bor-
rowers than credit unions. On the asset side of the
balance sheet, banks are not so dependent on
consumers or on their depositors. Business loans
are larger and more profitable (and riskier), while
business loans have been nonexistent or very small
at credit unions.13 For credit unions, their mem-
bers (consumers) are not only their key source of
deposits, they are also the borrowers.
However, credit unions are pursuing greater
small business lending. Credit unions recently
sought and won approval to do business lending
through Small Business Administration (SBA)
guaranteed loan programs. These loans are not
included in business loans for purposes of the legal
limit on business loans. Credit unions also ad-
vanced the Credit Union Regulatory
Improvement Act (H.R. 3579) in the 108th Con-
gress. This act would, among other provisions,
raise the limit on business lending to 20 percent
from 12.25 percent, double the size limit on such
loans that could be excluded from the limit from
$50,000 to $100,000, and exclude certain other
business loans from the cap. Since 2000, business
loans outstanding at credit unions have more than
doubled, rising from $4.1 billion to $8.9 billion
8Figure 1
Real Asset Growth Has Been More Rapid at Credit Unions Until the Mid-1990s
14 Similar comparisons have been made by Schenk (2004). He and the Credit Union National Association (2004a) also argue
that credit unions consistently rate higher in consumer satisfaction than banks.  This is another example of a lack of compara-
bility, however, because credit unions are small and more closely tied to their consumer customer base than banks.  A proper
comparison would compare similar-sized institutions serving comparable customer bases.  Why would one expect larger and
more business-oriented banks to earn high marks from households that are relatively unimportant as sources of a funds or as
borrowers?  While banks value consumer business, for many banks consumers are not the core business or the focus of
marketing efforts.
-5
0
5
10
15
20 Credit Unions
Banks
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
19
99
19
98
19
97
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
90
19
89
19
88
19
87
19
86
19
85
19
84
19
83
19
82
19
81
19
80
19
79
19
78
19
77
19
76
19
75
19
74
Pe
rc
en
t
in 2003, a 28.8 percent annual rate of growth. As
recently as 1997, these loans were only $2.9 bil-
lion. Banks, which specialize in business loans,
actually saw such loans decline from 2000 to
2003. Commercial and industrial loans, farm
loans and commercial real estate loans fell 3 per-
cent over the period, or about $47.2 billion.
Another reason why credit unions are not
easily comparable with banks is the difference in
size. At the end of 2003, total assets at insured
commercial banks ($7.2 trillion) were 11.6 times
the total assets of credit unions and a few banks,
including Citigroup and J.P Morgan Chase, were
each bigger than the whole credit union industry.
The number of commercial banks, 7,769, was 17
percent lower than the number of credit unions,
but their average size was large enough to make
the average-sized bank, measured by total assets,
about 14 times as large as the average sized credit
union. About half of credit unions had total assets
less than $10 million at the end of 2003, while
less than 1.5 percent of banks were this small.
About half of all banks had assets in excess of
$100 million at the end of 2003, while only about
12 percent of credit unions were this large. The
other half of banks, those with assets less than
$100 million, are in the same size class as 88 per-
cent of credit unions, but again most of those are
much smaller than banks. Notably, the largest
overlap in terms of competition and size is in the
$10 million to $100 million size class, which
includes about half of all banks and about 30 to
40 percent of all credit unions. In this class banks
and credit unions primarily compete with each
other and not with the largest banks or credit
unions.
A large bank, under regulatory definitions, is
defined to have assets in excess of $1 billion, but
only 82 credit unions (0.9 percent) had assets this
large at the end of 2003. There were 424 banks,
(5.4 percent of all banks) with assets this large.
The average size of total bank assets ($968 mil-
lion) is close to this threshold.14 The number of
large credit unions is growing rapidly, however. At
the end of 2000 there were a little over half as
many, only 43 credit unions (0.4 percent of credit
unions), with assets over $1 billion, while the
number of large banks was 397 (4.8 percent), not
much different from that at the end of 2003. The
number of large credit unions rose 90.6 percent in
only three years while the number of large banks
rose only 6.8 percent.
9Credit unions are also changing their fields of
membership and expanding their geographic cov-
erage to become dominant financial institutions in
some local markets. For example, Citizens Equity
First in Peoria, Illinois, originally the credit union
for Caterpillar Corporation and the largest finan-
cial institution in the area, has expanded its field to
include employees in selected employer groups and
people in 14 neighboring counties. It is the six-
teenth largest federally insured credit union with
$2.6 billion in assets (at the end of 2003). America
First Credit Union, in Ogden, Utah, the twelfth
largest credit union with assets of $2.7 billion, is
also the largest institution in its area. It defines its
field of membership to include people who live,
work, worship, attend school or volunteer in any
of six counties or within a twelve-mile radius of
Mesquite, Utah. The pattern of growth and change
among the nation’s credit unions is characterized
by expanded geographic coverage, dominance in
some local financial markets, and the adoption of
more generic names with no reference to a narrow
field of operation. The top ten credit unions by
asset size include credit unions based in such small
and medium-sized cities or suburbs as: Merrifield,
Virginia; Raleigh, North Carolina; Alexandria,
Virginia; Sacramento, California; Santa Ana, Cali-
fornia; Tukwila, Washington; Tampa, Florida; The
Dallas-Fort Worth Airport; San Antonio, Texas;
and Manhattan Beach, California. Their assets of
$2.9 to $20 billion give them a dominant share in
local markets, though many operate state-wide or
nationally.
Another feature of credit unions is that there
are very large “corporate” credit unions that pro-
vide wholesale financial services to their owners,
which are smaller credit unions. Credit unions
could use the correspondent banking services of
larger banks for their deposit and asset services,
help with unusually large loans or more special-
ized banking services, just as small banks do, but
banks are taxed and so the prices of their services
would include tax cost. To avoid these higher costs
of wholesale financial services, corporate credit
unions were set up to provide the same services as
corespondent banks. At the end of 2003 there
were 31 such institutions holding $108.8 billion
in assets. The largest and oldest, U.S. Central
Credit Union in Lenexa, Kansas, holds $35 billion
in assets and is owned by only 72 member credit
unions. These assets are largely passed through
credit unions, so adding them to the credit union
assets in Table 1 would be double counting. How-
ever, the earnings of these credit unions are also
untaxed and no allowance has been made here or
elsewhere for these untaxed assets in estimates of
the tax loss from federal income tax exemption.
The main reason for comparing credit unions
with banks, however, is that banks are in the same
competitive market for credit union depositors
and also, though to a lesser extent, for credit
union borrowers. In terms of a “level playing
field,” it is like-sized banks that are the most dis-
advantaged by the tax exemption available for
credit unions of similar size. Banks might grow
more slowly than credit unions for a variety of
reasons that do not depend on the tax advantage
of credit unions. For example, since banks serve
business borrowers and business and government
depositors, different growth rates in their demands
for funds or for deposits relative to consumer
demand could result in different growth rates.
This issue is not addressed here. Instead the differ-
ence in growth rates is offered simply as evidence
consistent with a cost advantage at credit unions.
While credit union assets have grown faster
than bank assets in the past, the number of credit
unions is declining, just as is the number of banks.
For example, from 1999 through 2003 the num-
ber of credit unions declined from 10,626 to
9,369 (-11.8 percent, an annual rate of decline of
3.1 percent). But this consolidation belies the
vibrant growth of the sector. Besides rapid asset
growth overall (48.3 percent), there was a large
increase in credit union membership from 75.4
million to 82.4 million (9.3 percent or 2.2 percent
per year). Bank assets grew by less, a still robust 33
percent, but the number of insured commercial
banks fell 6.6 percent to 7,769 at the end of 2003.
The consolidation of credit unions is proceeding
faster than that of banks. The number of credit
unions above $1 billion in assets more than
doubled between 2000 and 2004, from 43 to 93.
The consolidation in the number of credit
unions is occurring at both federally and state-
chartered institutions, with many large,
aggressively growing credit unions swallowing up
small, traditional credit unions. The decline in the
number of federally chartered credit unions since
1999 has been 12 percent, only slightly faster than
the 11.6 percent decline in the number of state-
chartered credit unions. Federally chartered credit
unions are no longer growing much faster than
state-chartered ones. At the end of 2003, 61.7
percent of the 9,369 credit unions were federally
chartered, still about the same percentage as at the
end of 1999, despite their slightly faster pace of
decline. However, asset growth at federally char-
tered credit unions has slowed relative to others,
just as overall growth of credit union assets has
slowed relative to bank assets. Figure 2 shows the
relative size of federal credit union assets com-
pared with assets of banks and state-chartered
credit unions.
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Figure 2
Taxed Banks and CUs Grew More Slowly Than Federally-Chartered CUs Until the 1990s
Table 1
Selected Differences in the Performance of Federal- and State-Chartered Credit Unions (2003)
All insured CU Federal CU State CU
Mean Total Mean Total Mean Total
________________ _________________ _________________
Total assets ($ millions) $65.1 $610,156 $58.3 $336,585 $76.1 $273,572
Net worth (percent of assets) 10.72% 10.80% 10.62%
Delinquent loans (percent of loans) 0.77% 0.76% 0.78%
Total loans (percent of assets) 61.64% 60.27% 63.33%
Net income (percent of assets) 0.95% 0.97% 0.92%
Gross income ($ millions) $3.86 $36,147 $3.42 $19,765 $4.56 $16,382
Interest margin (percent of assets) 3.27% 3.25% 3.30%
Operating expenses (percent of assets) 3.09% 3.03% 3.16%
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Federally chartered credit unions are more
numerous, and they are slightly more profitable
than state-chartered institutions, but in terms of
assets, they are smaller, on average. Table 1 shows
that federal credit unions, which again account for
about 61.6 percent of the total number in 2003,
account for 55.2 percent of total credit union
assets, though the mean asset size of $76.1 million
is 23 percent smaller than that for state-chartered
credit unions. Federally chartered credit unions
have a larger total gross and net income, about
54.7 percent and 56.4 percent of the respective
totals, but these shares are smaller than the relative
numbers, so that the average income measure for
federal credit unions is smaller reflecting their
lower average asset size. As a return on total assets,
the net income of federal credit unions is slightly
larger (0.97 percent) than that for state-chartered
credit unions (0.92 percent), though both are
close to the one-percent rule of thumb for banks.
The interest margin for federal credit unions is
slightly smaller, but their operating expenses are
also smaller than those of state-chartered institu-
tions. The smaller federal credit unions have, on
average, a higher equity ratio (net worth to assets),
but the implied rate of return on equity at federal
credit unions (8.98 percent) exceeds that of the
average state credit union (8.66 percent).
III. The Sources of Competitive
Advantage: Sponsorship and Tax
Exemption
The academic literature on credit unions has
paid little attention to the federal income tax
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15 The estimate is based on a conservative assumption that real credit union assets grow at the 6 percent pace they registered from
1993-2003 and that prices rise at a 2 percent rate, the same as over the ten-year period 1993-2004. Interest rates are assumed
to average levels of the same earlier ten-year period.
16 Florida Tax Watch (2003) estimates the tax loss in Florida alone is $102 million.  In Florida, as in several other states, all credit
unions are exempt from state and local taxes, except for state-chartered credit unions  that face real and tangible property taxes.
The estimate includes all tax savings that arise from special exemptions from taxes for credit unions.
exemption of credit unions. Instead, the emphasis
on credit union competitive advantage has focused
on sponsorship (see the review of the literature in
Emmons and Schmid (2001), for example). The
typical or traditional common bond of credit
unions has been either a single occupational bond
or an associational bond. In both cases, the com-
pany, union or workers sponsor the credit union
and provide valuable resources. In a fair tax sys-
tem, sponsors would account for such subsidies as
grants and not as tax-deductible expenses and
credit unions would show these subsidies as in-
come. But sponsors are likely accounting for these
subsidies as tax-deductible expenses, reducing
their own taxes, and compounding the inequities
in the tax system. Again in an equitable system,
these benefits from sponsors would be taxable
income that is not currently measured in credit
union net income.
Occupational credit unions are the most nu-
merous. For example, Emmons and Schmid
(2001) point out that in 1996 about 75 percent of
credit unions had an occupational common bond.
One example of the benefit of sponsorship is free
or subsidized services. In 2003, there were 2,003
credit unions (21.4 percent) that had an annual
occupancy expense of zero or less. Another one-
third (34.1 percent) had occupancy expenses of
less than $2,000 per month, so that more than
half of all credit unions (55.5 percent) had average
monthly occupancy costs below that level. An-
other 11 percent had occupancy expenses ranging
from $2,000 to $4,000 per month and 11 percent
had rents from $4,000 to $8,000 per month.
Thus, 77.5 percent of all credit unions had occu-
pancy costs less than $8,000 per month. The
importance of tax exemption in holding down
cost has not been the focus, despite the fact that it
would swamp the value of all other subsidies of
credit unions.
Because of the focus on sponsorship, a key
issue in credit union research has been why firms
sponsor them and who benefits, with the latter
question focusing on whether borrowers benefit
through lower loan rates or depositors gain
through higher deposit rates or some combination
of the two. A related issue is who controls a credit
union: the sponsor, members (either as depositors
or borrowers), or the market. Another important
tax policy issue is the incidence of the cost advan-
tage that credit unions have whether arising from
sponsorship, free services from members or tax
exemption. In addition, a cost advantage could
affect the market for competing providers, espe-
cially banks and thrifts. Before taking up the
question of incidence however, it is important to
assess the value of the tax exemption.
IV. How Large Is the Tax Loss and How
Big is its Implied Advantage for
Credit Unions?
The easiest way to estimate the tax loss is to
estimate the tax that would have been paid if net
income were subject to federal corporate income
taxes. Based on data for all insured credit unions,
net income in 2003 was $5.8 billion and the
computed taxes would have been $2 billion. The
effective tax rate would have been 33.97 percent.
Government budget estimates often include a
five-year revenue loss estimate and a ten-year
revenue loss estimate. For the period 2004 to
2008, the five-year revenue loss estimate is $12.6
billion and the ten-year estimate is $31.3 billion.
These losses indicate a much more substantial
subsidy and tax revenue loss than existing govern-
ment estimates.15
Chmura (2004) estimates a tax loss of $1.2
billion for 2002, based on a tax rate of about 33.3
percent, but net income was $5.7 billion in 2002
and this fraction or the higher estimated tax rate
for 2003 result in an estimate of $1.9 billion.16
The smaller estimates by Chmura Economics and
Analytics and by government sources cited below
probably arise because they do not take into ac-
count firms that have no earnings or negative net
income and therefore would pay no federal in-
come tax. However, this source of difference
cannot explain much of the difference with gov-
ernment estimates because the losses are small. In
2003, 12 percent of all credit unions fell in this
category and reduced the total net income of
insured credit unions by $117 million. Netting
their losses against all income would understate
the potentially taxable net income of credit unions
and understate the total tax liability.
The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT)
regularly estimates the “tax expenditure”
associated with the federal income tax exemption.
A tax expenditure is the revenue lost because of a
tax break, computed assuming that the beneficia-
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Table 2
Federal Tax Expenditures for the
Credit Union Exemption
(Joint Committee on Taxation Estimates)
Fiscal Tax Expenditure
Year ($billions)
2004 $1.2
2003 0.9
2002 0.9
2001 0.7
2000 0.8
1999 0.9
1998 0.8
1997 0.9
1996 0.8
1995 0.7
1994 0.4
1993 0.4
ries of the tax break would not alter their behavior
in its absence. It is comparable to the estimate
here or in Chmura. The JCT’s latest estimate for
fiscal year 2004 is $1.2 billion, according to
Bickley (2003). Table 2 shows recent historical
data for the tax loss from JCT publications.
Although JCT estimates are lower than those
compiled for this study, they show the amount of
tax revenue lost because of this exemption has
tripled in only 11 years.
The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) in the Office of the President also esti-
mates the tax loss due to the federal tax exemption
of credit unions. Their estimates are similar and
follow a similar methodology as the JCT. For
example, in the Federal budget, OMB estimates
that the tax loss was $1.3 billion in both 2003 and
2004.17 The OMB five-year tax loss estimate for
2005-2009 is $7.88 billion, which is far smaller
than our estimate of $13.66 billion for the same
period.
Based on an assessment of all credit unions,
however, the tax loss is substantially larger, about
$2 billion. This is over one-third of net income of
credit unions, so the repeal of the tax exemption
would add about 50 percent to the costs of credit
unions, especially larger ones (credit unions with
over $75 million of current net income, in this
case, because they face marginal tax rates of 34 to
39 percent).
Chmura (2004) also suggests that their esti-
mate is likely to be too high, largely because credit
unions would manage themselves to reduce tax-
able income, if, in fact, they were subject to fed-
eral income taxation. For example, banks tend to
use provisions against bad debt to reduce income
and boost capital reserves in order to cut taxable
income. If credit unions were taxed, they would
likely boost their debt provisions to lower taxable
income as well.
However, depending on the incidence of the
tax, explained in Section V below, credit union
taxes might be even higher than the estimates
here. For example, credit unions, faced with a
higher cost of capital, might be able to raise their
interest rates or lower deposit rates to cover the
higher cost. To the extent that credit unions were
able to keep deposits and loans while passing
along their higher taxes, gross and taxable income
would be larger than currently projected and
therefore their tax payments would be as well.
If credit unions did not have the ability to
pass on the higher taxes, credit unions would tend
to be smaller and some could be forced to close.
In this case, the taxable income of credit unions
would be lower than current net income and the
estimated tax gain from credit unions reported
here would be too large. However, in this case,
financial services business would switch from
credit unions to banks, thrifts and finance compa-
nies, raising taxable income and tax liabilities
there. In fact the tax receipts from those larger
institutions would be higher on the same income
transferred from credit unions because they are
generally in higher tax brackets. Thus, removing
the federal income tax exemption for credit
unions could raise more tax receipts than the esti-
mates here because their behavioral changes would
increase the tax base at credit unions or at their
competitors, whether the credit union sector
shrinks or remains as large as it is today.
V. The Incidence of the Tax Loss –
Who Gets the Tax Subsidy?
Who gets the $2 billion of annual tax sub-
sidy? The answer to this question is important
because it reveals who benefits from the tax ex-
emption and who is the key constituency for
maintaining it. It also reveals who does not gain
from the subsidy, though they may be the in-
tended beneficiaries. And are there effects of the
tax exemption on credit union competitors? The
possible beneficiaries are:
• credit union depositors (higher rates paid on
deposits),
• credit union borrowers (lower interest rates
on loans),
17 See Office of Management and Budget (2004), Table 18-1, p. 287.
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18 Emmons and Schmid (2003) provide a nice review of the tension between banks and credit unions and explain that the tax
exemption could either cause credit unions to be inefficient or it could give them a competitive advantage. They view these
effects as mutually exclusive, but tax-exempt status could lead to both results.  It is also possible that tax exemption could be
the result of greater inefficiency that occurs because of restrictions on credit unions, as well as the cause of greater inefficiency.
• credit unions managers and/or workers
(higher wages or other payments to manag-
ers, workers or the suppliers of services to
credit unions),18 or
• credit union owners could benefit from
larger retained earnings and capital of credit
unions providing support for faster growth
as well as a larger cushion against risk or
mismanagement.
A related argument is that credit union spon-
sors, at least for occupational credit unions,
benefit because they value the benefits of credit
union services to their members as part of the
human resources benefits they provide their em-
ployees. Any subsidy reduces the cost of these
benefits and contributes to employee compensa-
tion, even if there is no direct effect on the net
benefits of credit union customers other than the
convenience of employer provided financial ser-
vices. Hansman (1996) argues that these benefits
for sponsor firms explain the popularity and
growth of occupational credit unions. If these
credit unions were taxed, it would raise their costs
and reduce the sponsors’ incentive to sponsor or
subsidize a credit union.
If market prices for deposits, loans or re-
sources used in credit unions are affected, then it
is also possible that the effects of tax exemption on
credit unions also affect their competitors. Amel
and Hannan (1998) argue that non-local banks
and non-bank firms, such as thrifts and credit
unions, have no effect on bank deposit rates.
Moreover, in regulatory analyses of banking com-
petition for merger or other antitrust issues, credit
unions are routinely ignored, implicitly assuming
that credit unions do not affect pricing of banking
services. Yet, as Emmons and Schmid (2000)
emphasize, banks continue to oppose the legis-
lated advantages of credit union charters.
Incidence of the Tax Exemption
Figure 3 can be used to summarize the inci-
dence effects of tax exemption. A basic model of
the loan market is shown there. The analysis fo-
cuses on loans, but it applies more generally to
total assets and these terms are used interchange-
ably in applications of this analysis below. The
demand for credit union loans shown implies that
credit unions can make more loans if the interest
rate on loans is lower. If the loan rate were set in a
broader market (including banks, thrifts, loan
brokers and finance companies, say) then the
demand for loans would be horizontal at a mar-
ket-determined interest rate and the position of
the supply curve for loans would determine the
quantity of credit union loans. Two supply curves
are drawn that differ according to whether credit
union income is taxed. The higher supply price
corresponds to the supply price of loans if credit
unions are subject to federal income tax.
The supply curve in each case is upward slop-
ing and includes the cost of producing an
additional dollar of loans. It includes the addi-
tional operating expenses and the additional cost
of deposit funds and net worth in order to fund
the dollar of loans. If any of these costs rise as
loans expand, then the curve is upward sloping.
The interest cost of deposits could rise as loans
rise because a higher deposit volume could require
that credit unions offer higher deposit rates. The
latter component of cost could be unaffected by
the size of credit union assets if credit unions are a
relatively small part of the deposit market and
essentially take the deposit rate determined by
banks and thrifts as given. This is likely and sup-
ported by the data here since credit union assets
are little more than one-tenth the size of bank
assets. There is some evidence, noted below, that
credit unions may pay higher rates to fund larger
loan volume and if that is the case the slope of the
credit union loan supply curve is steeper than it
would otherwise be.
Note that the supply curves in Figure 3 are
based on long-run supply price. The distinction
here, as opposed to short-run supply, is that it
includes the cost of capital since capital is variable
in the long run and has to be compensated at the
market price of capital in order to remain in this
sector instead of moving to other business. More-
over, the supply of loans or assets in credit unions
requires that firms hold more equity as a buffer
against expected and unexpected losses as their
assets increase. Economic analyses often focus on
the short run, where capital or equity may be
treated as fixed, and conclude that an income tax
cannot affect output or price. For financial
institutions, capital is not fixed even in the short
run. Since income, in the long run, includes a
competitive return to owners this element of cost
must also be included in the supply price and
changes in tax rates affect the cost of equity capital
and therefore the supply price.
Higher taxes raise the cost of equity capital or
the amount that has to be earned to compensate
14
19 The after tax-rate of return on equity is (1-t) times the before-tax rate of return, where t is the tax rate.  Thus the supply price
of equity capital measured vertically in Figure 3 would rise by 1/(1-t) times the cost of equity capital as t rises from zero to one-
third. When the tax rate is one-third the cost of equity capital and the new supply price will rise by an amount that is 50%
percent larger than the cost of equity in the absence of the federal tax.
Figure 3
The Effect of a Tax on Credit Union Income
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the owners. More loans require that credit unions
hold larger capital and capital has a required rate
of return, so that the supply price of loans include
this cost of equity capital. Taxation of the return
to equity would raise this cost, shifting the supply
curve upward and to the left as shown in the
chart. If the tax rate is about one-third, then this
component of the supply price would rise about
50 percent.19 In recent years the rate of return on
assets, which equals the weighted cost of equity,
has been about one percent (see Table 1), so that
taxing credit unions would raise this cost by 50
basis points. This is the extent of the tax subsidy
per dollar of assets.
According to Figure 3, removing the tax ex-
emption would raise the rates charged by credit
unions for loans (from i0 to i1) and borrowers
would reduce the amount borrowed from credit
unions. Since total assets of credit unions would
fall (L0 to L1), the amount of capital required by
credit unions would also fall. Note that the inter-
est rate on loans would not rise as much as the
upward shift in the supply curve because loan
demand would fall for such a large increase, ac-
cording to Figure 3. If the supply curves are flat,
indicating that cost, especially credit union de-
posit rates, do not depend on loan volume, then
the tax would be fully reflected in higher loan
rates.
On the other hand, if the demand curve for
loans were flat, the tax increase would not affect
loan rates. In this case, loan value and desired
retained earnings and capital would fall more, and
loan rates would not rise. So long as loan volume
falls, deposit rates could decline if their volume
affects credit union deposit rates. In this case, the
rise in supply price could be partially offset by a
shift down in the cost of deposits. This would
lessen the effect of the removal of the tax exemp-
tion on loan rates and on the volume of loans.
The extent to which the removal of tax exemption
would raise loan rates, reduce deposit rates, or
15
affect loans or desired capital depends on how flat
the demand or supply curves are.
Another way that loan interest rates would be
unaffected by tax exemption is if competition
forces the subsidy to be passed on to depositors or
to managers or other suppliers of credit union
resources. Such a rise in cost would offset the tax
subsidy, shifting the “no tax” supply curve in Fig-
ure 3 back up toward its “with tax” position. In
this case the tax exemption would be absorbed by
other resource costs, and if it is completely passed
on in this way there would be no net effect on
loan volume or the size of the credit union sector
due to the tax exemption. There is evidence on
these issues that can inform an answer to the ques-
tion of who gets the $2 billion and how it is
passed to them.
Evidence on the Incidence of the Tax Exemption
Early studies of credit unions explored
whether credit unions paid higher deposit rates or
charged lower loan rates. Other potential inci-
dence effects, such as higher compensation or
other costs, lower sponsor outlays or larger net
worth, were ignored. The results of these studies
are mixed. Flannery (1974) argued that the evi-
dence supported lower loan rates. Emmons and
Schmid (2000) point out that a later study found
that deposit rates were higher, but a 1986 study
found that both borrowing and lending rates were
not different than at other institutions. Many
studies over the years, including several cited by
Emmons and Schmid (2000), support the hy-
pothesis that the more diffuse ownership of credit
unions has led to higher expenses at credit unions,
an indication of what is called “expense–prefer-
ence theory.” This is the notion that managers at
institutions without strong discipline from stock-
holders and the capital markets will maximize
their own well being instead of profits by paying
themselves high wages or other less obvious perks.
Such an agency problem is especially acute at non-
profit institutions or cooperatives, where equity
does not trade and managers may be able to re-
place the owners as the residual claimant of profit.
Some analysts have found some effects of
credit unions on local pricing of bank services,
however. Tokle and Tokle (2000) find that local
credit union market share of deposits has a signifi-
cant positive effect on deposit rates (significant for
one- and two-year certificate of deposit (CD)
rates, but not regular saving deposits, which are
called shares at credit unions). This study is based
on a small sample in rural Nevada and Montana
in 1998, however. More recently, Hannan (2002)
found that the credit union deposit-market share
has a significant positive effect on deposit rates at
banks for the three rates he studied: checking
deposits, money market deposit accounts and
three-month CDs, respectively. His study focuses
on banks in 100 metropolitan areas in 1998, using
data from Bank Rate Monitor. Emmons and
Schmid (2001) also provide evidence that higher
loan demand at credit unions raises deposit rates
at credit unions. They take this as evidence of a
“sponsor control” hypothesis, however, as opposed
to member control, either by dominant credit
union borrowers or dominant credit union de-
positors. The more important point is that it also
suggests that deposit rates at credit unions are not
determined in competitive deposit markets with
banks. Some evidence below questions that im-
plicit result, however.
Few studies have looked at loan rates at credit
unions and whether they affect comparable rates at
banks. However, Feinberg (2001 and 2002) finds
that the credit union market share of deposits has a
significant negative effect on new car loans in a
study of six years of data (1992-97) for a panel of
banks. That is, the larger is the share of credit
unions in the deposit market, the lower are new
car loan rates at banks. This suggests that the tax-
exempt credit union market share depresses new
car loan rates at all financial service institutions.
Higher Loan Rate or Lower Deposit Rates?
If the incidence of the tax exemption fell on
depositors or shareholders, who in this case are the
same people, credit unions could be expected to
pay higher rates on deposits than non-exempt
institutions (banks and thrifts).
Table 3 shows selected rates from a survey by
Bank Rate Monitor at the end of 2003. The evi-
dence is mixed for loan rates, but the only deposit
rate sampled, that on one-year CDs, is sharply
higher at credit unions than at non-exempt insti-
tutions. For loan rates, credit unions were
charging a slightly higher rate on 30-year mort-
gage loans, but less on one-year adjustable rate
mortgages and much less on home equity loans.
The largest difference was for new car loans where
credit unions charged much lower rates. This
survey suggests that the incidence of tax exemp-
tion falls on both borrowers and depositors at
credit unions, but relatively more heavily on loan
rates, especially car loan and credit card rates, than
the more competitive rates on real estate loans,
especially first mortgages, or deposits.
If the tax treatment of income affects the
pricing of loans at credit unions, it should be
apparent in the pricing of loans and deposits at
federal and state-chartered institutions. State-
chartered credit unions are not exempt from state
taxes, while federally chartered institutions are. If
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Table 3
Do Credit Unions Charge Less and Pay More Interest?
Loan Credit Unions Banks Thrifts
30-year fixed mortgage   5.88%   5.83%   5.80%
1-year adjustable mortgage 3.64 3.80 4.11
$10,000 home equity loan 4.54 5.03 4.52
48-month new-car loan 5.84 7.14 7.33
Variable credit card 10.20 13.13 14.59
1-year CD 1.71 0.98 1.34
Based on data compiled on Dec. 18, 2003
Source: Bankrate.com
Table 4
Federal Credit Unions Do Not Charge Lower Interest Rates or Pay Higher
Deposit Rates Than State-Chartered Credit Unions
December 31, 2003
Federal State
Credit Unions Credit Unions
First mortgage loan     6.3%    6.2%
Other real estate 6.3 6.1
New vehicle loan 5.9 5.7
Used vehicle loan 7.0 6.6
Credit card 11.5 11.7
Regular shares 1.1 1.1
Share drafts 0.5 0.5
CD (1 year) 1.7 1.7
Money market shares 1.1 1.1
Source: National Credit Union Administration
there is some incidence of taxes on loan interest
rates or on rates paid on deposits at credit unions,
the differences should show up in differences in
the average interest rates on different types of
loans or deposits for these two groups of credit
unions. Federal credit unions would be expected
to charge lower interest rates as competition in-
duces them to pass along some of their tax saving
to borrowers. Federal credit unions could also
compete by offering higher rates on deposits than
state-chartered ones. The NCUA reports interest
rates paid and charged at each type of institution
since 1992 in their on-line statistics (2003) for
various periods (see Table 4).
At the end of 2003 there were noticeable
differences in the rates on the key types of loans
offered, but the rates at federal institutions were
actually somewhat higher for mortgage loans,
other real estate loans, and for new and used car
loans. Only credit card interest rates were slightly
lower at federal credit unions than at state-char-
tered ones. Thus, it does not appear that the
incidence of the tax exemption falls on lower loan
rates which may be highly impacted by market
forces. Similar comparisons of earlier end-of-year
data from 1992 to the present show the same
result.
The bottom entries in the table show rates
paid by the two groups of four types of deposits.
They are identical, so the incidence of tax exemp-
tion does not appear to fall on deposit rates either.
Again, the same pattern of equal rates shows up in
earlier data. The incidence of the tax exemption
does not show up in higher deposit rates at federal
credit unions.
The pattern shown in Table 4 holds over time
as well. In the Appendix, the raw data for these
interest rates from 1992 to 2003 are shown in a
longer table. The differences between the interest
rates at federal and state-chartered institutions are
show in Table 5. Where the rates differ, they are
shown in bold when they conform to the tax inci-
dence hypothesis, that is, the rates on loans are
lower and rates on deposits are higher at federally
chartered institutions. Note that most of the en-
tries show no difference. For deposit rates, only
two entries are consistent with the incidence hy-
pothesis and nine other non-zero entries are of the
wrong sign. The mean difference for the deposit
rates is zero, which is consistent with the argu-
ment that credit union deposit rates are set in a
broader deposit market in which credit unions
make up a small market share.
For loan rates there are also more differences
that are non-zero and consistent with the tax-
incidence hypothesis, about 30 percent of the
observations, but there are slightly more pairs of
observations that have the wrong sign. Only credit
card rates are lower at federal credit unions in
more than two years and have a mean that is nega-
tive for the whole period. This pattern is
consistent with the argument above that loan rates
at credit unions are not different than in the taxed
sector of the financial industry because credit
unions are a small part of a very competitive mar-
ket. For car loans and credit cards, there is more
diversity and indeed, the credit card rates appear
to be systematically lower at federal as compared
with state-chartered institutions. Subjecting all
credit unions to the federal income tax is not
likely to affect market rates on credit cards outside
of credit unions and will have little effect on over-
all loan rates at credit unions. Credit card loans
account for only 5.8 percent of credit union loans
and even adding in all other unsecured credit
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Table 5
Difference in Interest Rates at Federal and State-Chartered Credit Unions: 1996-2003
Excess of Rate at Federal over State-Chartered Credit Unions
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Mean
First mortgage loan 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Other real estate – 0.1 0 0 0 – 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0
New vehicle loan 0 – 0.1 0 0 0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0
Used vehicle loan 0.2 0 0 0 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.1 0.4 0.1
Credit card – 0.2 – 0.2 0 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1
Regular shares – 0.1 – 0.1 0 – 0.1 0 – 0.1 0.1 0 0.0
Share drafts 0 – 0.1 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0
CD (1 year) 0 – 0.1 0 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0 0 0.0
Money market shares – 0.1 0 0 0 – 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.0
bold = consistent with incidence expectations
union loans raises the share to 10.4 percent of
loans and 6.6 percent of total assets. Thus even if
all of the incidence of the $2 billion tax break for
credit unions (50 basis points as a percent of as-
sets) fell only on these loans, removing the tax
break would have little effect. The supply price of
assets would rise about 5 basis points (6.6 percent
of 50 basis points).
Emmons and Schmid (1999, 2001, and
2004) have produced several studies that point to
strong competition between banks and credit
unions. They find that an increase in credit union
participation leads to an increase in bank market
concentration a year later. Moreover, increased
bank market concentration leads to increased
membership in credit unions. This is an example
of what is sometimes called “bi-directional causal-
ity.” It results, they suggest, from increased bank
concentration resulting in higher prices for bank-
ing services and/or lower deposit rates. Thus, bank
concentration leads bank customers to switch to
credit unions. However, increased credit union
membership presumably boosts competition in
financial markets so that banks are forced to con-
solidate, continuing a cycle of increasing growth
of credit unions and increased concentration in
banking. Recall, however, that the trend of con-
solidation that raises concentration is also
occurring at credit unions, which are declining in
number as well.
Are Employment Costs Higher at Credit Unions?
Emmons and Schmid (2000) also provide a
useful review of the literature on credit unions
efficiency, noting in particular, that Fried, Lovell
and Vanden Eeckaut (1993) find that credit
unions exhibit the same degree of widespread
operating inefficiency as found at other depository
institutions. Employment costs make up about
half the operating costs of credit unions and about
one-fourth (25.9 percent) of total credit union
gross income or cost. Relative to total assets in
2003, this is about 1.54 percent.
Chmura (2004, p. 33) compares the em-
ployee compensation costs of credit unions and
banks. For six asset classes, ranging from under $2
million to over $500 million of assets, Chmura
finds that credit unions’ employee compensation
cost per dollar of assets is about 11 basis points
higher, on average, and higher in all but two asset
classes of credit unions. The two exceptions are
institutions with assets from $10 to $50 million,
where the share is smaller at credit unions by one
basis point, and over $500 million, where the
share of credit unions is smaller by eight basis
points. The highest levels of excessive employee
compensation cost occur for credit unions in the
$2 to $10 million class where compensation is 26
basis points higher than at comparably sized banks
(1.86 percent vs. 1.60 percent). The other is a
group of large credit unions those with assets of
$100 to $500 million, where credit unions have
compensation that is larger by 30 basis points of
assets (1.69 percent vs. 1.39 percent). Generally
then, it appears that credit unions may have
slightly higher employee compensation costs, but
there are exceptions and they are not clearly linked
to asset size. For the next to smallest and the next
to largest asset size classes, credit unions appear to
have smaller employee compensation costs. While
credit unions appear to have higher employer
costs, perhaps reflecting that the tax exemption
benefit is partially being captured by the managers
and workers in credit unions through higher
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wages or lower productivity, the difference is not
large nor does it vary systematically by size of
credit union. While the lower employee cost at the
largest credit unions suggests that bank competi-
tion may constrain employee costs more
effectively, the effect does not continuously dimin-
ish with the size of credit unions, casting doubt on
this channel of incidence.
Emmons and Schmid (2000) find that there
is a positive relation between relative wage levels at
credit unions (compared with average local wages)
and asset size for occupational credit unions spon-
sored by employers, at least for credit unions with
assets up to about $65 million. This was the aver-
age size credit union in 2003. They interpret this
to mean that the cost of financial distress rises
with asset size and so the sponsor of the credit
union pays higher wages to induce managers of
the credit union to shirk less. One alternative that
they do not rule out, however, is that credit union
size, per se, raises the cost of a sponsor monitoring
the management, or what is called “agency cost,”
so that the agents (management) can get away
with higher wage premiums. More important, any
wage premium declines with asset size for larger
institutions, according to their evidence, and this
supports the notion that competitive pressures and
superior management at large credit unions con-
trols shirking without bribes or premiums from
sponsors. It is not likely then that the tax subsidy
for credit unions has been absorbed by signifi-
cantly higher employee and management costs.
Does the Tax Break Accrue to Owners Through
Retained Earnings, Larger Assets and Net Worth?
A final possibility is that the tax break is ab-
sorbed by the expansion of credit union assets to a
size that can be supported by the enhanced excess
earnings of the credit unions. A tax break initially
raises the rate of return on assets and equity, given
the volume of loans, assets and equity. More im-
portantly, it shifts the supply price of loans down
or to the right because the cost of equity capital
falls.
When the loan demand is flat at an interest
rate determined in broader loan markets (includ-
ing banks and other financial institutions), the
incidence of the tax break shows up in the size of
credit union loans (assets). In the absence of a
decline in loan rates, an increase in deposit rates,
or a change in the other costs of new loans, the
supply of loans would tend to expand, so that the
new supply of loans would equal i0 in Figure 3 at a
larger quantity of loans and equity. Equity will rise
due to the increased loan (asset) supply and be-
cause the equity ratio will rise in response to the
higher rate of return on equity.
Given the required rate of return on equity,
the cost of equity and of assets (loans) will rise as
the equity ratio, the ratio of net worth to assets
increases. This brings the supply price of loans
back to its initial level at i0 in Figure 3, but at a
larger supply of credit union assets. In this case,
the incidence of the tax break is confined to the
largest possible increase in the size of credit union
assets and equity.
Again, in this case, removing the tax break
would shift the supply curve up and lower the size
of credit union assets and loans. At the initial
supply of loans, L0, the supply price rises 50 basis
points if the initial rate of return on assets is one
percent. Loan interest rates would not be affected,
however, nor would the interest rate on deposits
(if it is also determined in a competitive deposit
market with banks and thrifts and where credit
unions are a relatively small share of the market),
nor would the other costs of credit unions. The
maximum size effect of the removal of the tax
exemption is to lower assets and to lower the net-
worth-asset ratio by one-third. The ROA would
initially be lowered by the tax increase and the
decline in the net worth-asset ratio would further
depress the ROA of taxed credit unions. Ulti-
mately the ROA would decline to the same extent
as the equity ratio, one-third under the assump-
tions here, but regulatory constraints could keep
the equity ratio from declining this much.
 Under these assumptions the incidence of the
tax exemption is to raise credit union assets. The
rate of return on assets would rise due to the tax
exemption as well, because of the rise in the equity
ratio and its effect boosting the cost of capital.
Reversing this process indicates the effects of re-
moving the tax exemption. To the extent that the
demand for loans is not horizontal or that other
costs are not raised by the tax exemption, the
removal of the tax exemption would not reduce
assets as much.
To examine whether the incidence of the tax
exemption falls on the size of the tax-exempt insti-
tution, a comparison of rates of return and equity
ratios at federal and state-chartered credit unions
could be helpful. If a tax break is made available
to federal credit unions only, then it would be
reflected in an initial rise in their rate of return on
assets and assets. Competition would lead these
credit unions to expand assets and the equity ratio
with the equity generated by higher earnings. In
the end, the tax-favored credit unions would ex-
pand relative to the less favored credit unions, the
rate of return on equity would be unchanged, but
the rate of return on assets and the equity ratio
would be higher at federal credit unions than at
state-chartered credit unions.
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Figure 4
The Rate of Return on Assets at More Heavily Taxed State Credit Unions Is Not Lower
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Figure 4 suggests that the competitive as-
sumption, that the ROE at federal credit unions
would return to its initial value (the ROE at state-
chartered credit unions) holds fairly well. In fact
the rate of return on equity is slightly smaller for
the lower-taxed federal credit unions than for the
state-chartered ones. In 2003 the federal ROE was
9.54 percent, somewhat above the 8.95 percent
rate at state-chartered institutions. But for the full
period and over the past six years the rate of return
is actually smaller, on average, at federal credit
unions. From 1998 through 2003, the averages
were 8.96 percent at federal credit unions and
9.10 percent at state-chartered institutions, for
example. Thus the basic long-run assumption does
not hold for the period and the relative size of
rates of return does not even fit the initial effect of
tax exemption, which should make the rate of
return on equity initially higher at federal credit
unions.
The absence of equality of long-run ROEs
means that it is not so likely that the two key
incidence conclusions will hold either. First, the
federal ROA is higher, but not by enough to sug-
gest that the incidence of the tax-exempt status
falls on size alone. In 2003, the Federal credit
unions had an ROA of 1.03 percent, 8 basis
points above that of state-chartered institutions.
However, from 1998 to 2003, the average ROA
was 0.99 percent at both sets of institutions. Thus
the ROA evidence does not support the notion
that the incidence of tax exemption falls on the
relative size of the institutions.
The equity ratio implication fares somewhat
better, but not by enough to support the idea that
incidence only affects asset and equity size. The
equity ratio (not shown) of the federal credit
unions is not much larger. Since 1997, the mean
equity ratio was larger, but not by much. For the
past six years, the average federal equity ratio was
11.06 percent, about 23 basis points higher than
at state-chartered credit unions. In 2003, the fed-
eral equity ratio was 10.80 percent, only 28 basis
points higher than the 10.52 ratio for state-char-
tered credit unions. One possible reason is that
the tax burden at state-chartered credit unions
may not be large enough to make a difference
between the two types of institutions.20
Another consideration is that equity ratios are
determined not only by the economics of the
institution, especially its tax status, but also by
regulatory constraint. Regulators evaluate the
equity ratio as a positive factor in determining the
performance of credit unions. Thus equity ratios
do not simply reflect the influence of economic
factors such as the exemption from state taxes.
The equity ratio at state-chartered institutions
could be higher than expected because of regula-
tory pressures to hold it up relative to where it
would be if tax considerations alone were taken
into account. That would, in turn, require the
ROA for state-chartered institutions to be higher
20
20 The NCUA, the federal credit union regulator, and CUNA, the national trade association for credit unions, do not publicize
data on taxes paid by state-chartered credit unions, so it is difficult to evaluate the significance of these taxes directly.  Most
institutions use the NCUA’s call report template to report their costs so that taxes are included in “miscellaneous operating
expenses” on in the case of sales taxes sometimes in “operating fees.”
21 See CBO (2004), for example.
22 In 2003, commercial and industrial loans and commercial real estate accounted for 11.5 percent and 7.9 percent of bank
assets, respectively.  While credit unions are expanding their business lending, which could be more safely and profitably
supported by their relatively high equity ratio, it remains minuscule in comparison.
23 The average ROA for the ten years 1994-2003 was 1.01 percent, below the average for banks, 1.21 percent.  Gunther and
Moore (2004b) argue that using summary measures for each firm’s performance ratio is superior to ratios computed for the
group.  Using data for individual credit unions and summary measures for banks prepared by the FDIC does not alter the
conclusions here, however.
as well to hold up the ROE.
If the tax break did not fully affect the size of
the tax-free sector, then the loan rate would be
lower and/or operating costs or deposit rates
would be higher to offset the tax break at an un-
changed asset size. In all three cases, assets, or the
size of the tax-free sector, would be less affected by
the tax break. When the rate of interest on loans is
depressed or the non-interest operating cost is
raised, assets are not as affected, but the equity
ratio still rises because the cost of equity capital is
reduced relative to the cost of deposits. When the
tax break is passed on in the form of higher de-
posit rates only, there is little or no effect on the
equity ratio or asset size. In this case the cost of
both deposits and of equity capital rise, providing
little or no incentive to boost the equity ratio or
assets.
The evidence above for loan rates, especially
for credit card and auto loans, suggests that inci-
dence could fall somewhat more heavily on loan
rates (about 6 out of 50 basis points according to
the analysis there). To the extent that tax inci-
dence falls on deposit rates or other costs [no
more than 11 basis points according to the
Chmura (2004) evidence above] the supply price
rises to offset its reduction due to the tax break.
The supply curve in Figure 3 does not shift down
as much and credit union assets and equity are not
boosted as much by the tax break. Similarly in
these cases the removal of the tax break would not
reduce the size of the untaxed credit union sector
as much.
This evidence indicates that the effect of the
subsidy does not fall on the equity ratio or size,
which is surprising in light of other evidence. For
example, research on government sponsored enter-
prises (GSEs) shows that the effect of the public
perception that debt of these institutions is backed
by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government
falls largely on the companies (assets or equity
ratio) and not on their interest rates or overall
operating costs.21
There is also some evidence that the effect on
the asset structure of credit unions is the domi-
nant one. A comparison of credit unions with
banks shows that the incidence of credit union tax
exemption falls largely on the equity ratio of the
credit union sector. In 2003, the equity ratio of all
commercial banks, at 9.10 percent, was well below
the 10.7 percent rate for credit unions (see Table
6). This 17.8 percent larger equity ratio is consis-
tent with the tax incidence analysis which suggests
that credit unions should have a much larger
equity ratio than banks if their tax exemption
mainly affects their equity size. While the equity
ratio at credit unions is not large enough to justify
a conclusion that incidence falls completely on the
size of the equity ratio, it does suggest that this is
the major effect.
However, banks are riskier than credit unions
because they are much more dependent on loans
to the more cyclical and secularly risky business
sector.22 Thus even on a long-run basis, one might
expect banks to have a higher ROE than credit
unions. Equality of ROEs applies to equally risky
firms; riskier firms should have a higher ROE to
compensate for greater risk, so that only the risk-
adjusted ROEs are equal. On a risk-adjusted basis,
the equity ratio at credit unions would be even
larger than the actual difference. The smaller eq-
uity ratio at banks may also reflect size differences.
Larger financial intermediaries are more diversi-
fied and hold smaller equity ratios. For example,
banks with assets below $100 million held equity
equal to 11.27 percent, less than the 11.87 per-
cent held by credit unions in the same size class.
The latest year’s data underestimate the usual
difference in these ratios. In 2003 the average
credit union equity ratio was only 10.72 percent.
As Figure 5 shows, however, the equity ratio for all
credit unions was unusually low and that of banks
relatively high in 2003, 17.8 percent larger than
that of the average bank ratio. For the past ten
years shown in Figure 5, the credit union equity
ratio was 26.6 percent larger than at banks. Credit
unions consistently have higher ratios and usually
ratios that are much higher than in 2003. In fact,
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Table 6
Credit Unions Hold Larger Equity Ratios and Earn Lower Rates of Return on
Assets (2003)
CU
Credit Unions Banks Equity
____________ ______________ ______
Equity Equity Excess
Size Class ROA Ratio ROA Ratio (%)
All 0.95 10.72 1.4 9.1 17.8
< $100 million 0.66 11.87 0.94 11.27 5.4
$100 million to $1 billion 0.96 10.68 1.26 9.9 7.9
> $1 billion 1.15 9.89 1.43 8.92 10.8
Figure 5
Credit Unions Have a Higher Equity Ratio Than Banks
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the average excess for the past ten years accords
very well with the maximum incidence of tax
exemption on the equity ratio, especially when
one considers that riskier banks would choose to
hold higher ratios even if the tax treatment were
the same.
Banks have a higher rate of return on assets
than credit unions despite their higher tax rate. In
2003 the ROA at commercial banks based on net
income and end-of-year assets equaled 1.4 per-
cent.23 This reflects the shift in larger banks to
diversify their income generating products. The
higher ROA for banks and lower equity ratio
combine to produce a higher ROE at banks. In
2003, banks earned a 15.4 percent ROE, well
above that of credit unions (10.2 percent). This
means that the actual equity ratio difference un-
derstates the tax incidence effect on the size of
credit unions. Thus comparing banks and credit
unions is fraught with difficulties because of many
fundamental differences in the businesses besides
their tax treatment.
Another strong indication of the effect of the
credit union tax subsidy is the chartering pattern
of credit union and banks. There are many factors
that influence whether a bank or credit union
obtains its charter from the state or from the fed-
eral government chartering institution (the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency or the NCUA,
respectively). There is no difference in the tax
treatment of state-chartered and federally char-
tered banks, but there is a difference for credit
unions. Since federally chartered credit unions
have more tax advantages than state-chartered
credit unions, there should be relatively more of
them, given other factors that influence this deci-
sion. And there are relatively more of them. For
banks at the end of 2003, 30.6 percent (2,814 out
of 9,181 banks) were federally chartered, while
61.6 percent of credit unions were federally char-
tered at the same time, about twice the share of
federal bank charters.
A key difference between banks and credit
unions is that bank shareholders can make asset
decisions that are almost completely separate from
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their demand for banking services. People who
bank at one institution can be stockholders in
another, and shareholders in a bank do not have
to be depositors or borrowers. Credit union share-
holders cannot sell their ownership claims. This
puts their equity claims under the full control of
management, and this can lead to capital market
inefficiency. Active capital market evaluation con-
tributes to enhanced efficiency at banks, holding
down the equity ratio and boosting ROA in order
to raise the ROE. It also provides strong incentives
against sponsor abuse or managerial abuse of
owner interests.
While the evidence on the incidence of the
tax break is mixed, this largely reflects the equality
of data on credit union costs and loan rates. Most
of the analysis and inferential conclusions here
support the view that the principal benefit of the
tax incidence is to boost the size of the credit
union sector and not to lower loan rates or boost
deposit rates for credit union customers.
Summary
While the tax expenditure arising from credit
union tax exemption is large and growing, data
limitations, especially on comparable interest rates
and cost, preclude a definitive estimate of the
incidence of the tax. The overall effect of the tax
exemption can be measured as the rise in the rate
of return on assets, before taxes, that would be
required to keep the rate of return on assets, after
tax, unchanged. With a tax rate of one-third and
average rate of return on assets of one percent, the
ROA before taxes in the absence of the exemption
would have to be 1.50 percentage points, or 50
basis points higher. This is the size of the subsidy
(per dollar of assets) that accrues to the beneficia-
ries of the current tax exemption.
Research on GSEs and credit union research
support the view that the principal incidence of
tax exemption is an increase in the total assets and
equity ratio of the credit union sector. However,
direct evidence comparing more or less highly
taxed credit unions that are all exempt from fed-
eral income taxation is not very supportive of this
conclusion. Evidence on other incidence effects is
also not strong except for some evidence that
credit unions charge lower interest rates on loans,
especially on those loans where efficient national
markets do not constrain credit union pricing,
most notably credit card loans and to a lesser
extent car loans.
Based on the evidence analyzed here, the
conclusions are that some 6 basis points of the 50
basis point subsidy accrues to credit union bor-
rowers through lower interest rates, while no more
than 11 basis points are absorbed by higher labor
costs. There is little or no effect on deposit rates or
other costs. Thus, 33 to 44 basis points of the
subsidy accrue to owners in the form of larger
equity and larger assets. No allowance has been
made for the reduced credit union costs of spon-
sors, but to the extent that these are large it is a
transfer within the firm and has little or no effect
on the size of credit unions or tax receipts. Ending
tax exemption could be expected to reduce the
relative size of credit unions and to reduce their
growth rate. Existing taxpaying financial service
firms would gain market share, absorbing the lost
market share of credit unions and boosting tax
revenues even more. The equity ratio of credit
unions would be reduced; management of capital
costs would make credit unions more efficient,
perhaps lowering operating costs and interest rates
on deposits and raising rates on loans, at least in
some markets. Credit unions would be more sub-
ject to market control and would manage risk and
return more efficiently, increasing the value of
their franchises to their owners, despite smaller
relative size and slower growth.
VI. Proposals for Change
Abolish the Exemption or Leave it Only for Small
Credit Unions?
One proposal for tax reform that often arises
is to leave the tax exemption for small credit
unions and abolish it for large, complex credit
unions. One specific proposal is to restrict the
federal income tax exemption to institutions with
total assets of less than $10 million.24 The ratio-
nale for this proposal is that only the larger credit
unions are similar and competitive with banks and
other financial intermediaries, at least from a
household or consumer standpoint. In addition,
smaller credit unions generally have traditional or
narrow common bonds and are more likely to
serve the purpose of the cooperative credit union
movement. Bickley (2003) and the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation estimate that the $1.2 billion tax
expenditure or subsidy to credit unions in 2004
would have been cut to $1.0 billion if only those
24 Chmura Economics and Analytics (2004) notes that the Reagan administration proposed that credit unions with assets in
excess of $5 million lose their federal income tax exemption as part of their broad tax reform that occurred in 1986. This
recommendation was apparently rejected in congressional debate over the otherwise sweeping reforms.  Indexed for inflation,
the Reagan-era exemption would be about $8 million today. The Carter administration also had proposed removing the tax
exemption for all credit unions, according to Chmura.
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with assets greater than $10 million are included.
This suggests that about $200 million in lost tax
revenue is due to the tax exemption of small credit
unions. As noted above, however, the tax loss for
all credit unions is closer to $2 billion and remov-
ing the exemption for credit unions with assets
bigger than $10 million would represent the bulk
of any tax gain, according to this study’s estimates.
The OMB estimates that the ten-year revenue
gain for 2004 to 2013 from taxing the credit
unions with assets in excess of $10 million is $12
billion. The five-year estimate (2004–2008) is $5
billion, including $0.6 billion in 2004 and $1
billion in 2005. The 2004 estimate is smaller
because it is assumed that the proposal is imple-
mented for only half of 2004.25 Our estimate is
$12.5 billion for the 5-year period and $31 billion
for the ten-year period. The estimates are not
much different than the tax revenue gain from
taxing all credit unions.
This proposal would leave the exemption for
very small credit unions, but it would restore
neutrality for larger credit unions. This is called a
practical solution because only about half of credit
unions (51.1 percent) had total assets in excess of
$10 million in 2003. So only 4,792 would be-
come taxable and of these, nearly 6 percent had
no income in 2003, so only about 4,512 would
have had a tax bill, based on reported net income.
However, taxing these credit unions, 48.1 percent
of all the credit unions in the country, would tax
98.1 percent of the net income of all credit unions
and collect 98.9 percent of the revenue from tax-
ing all of them. Thus, it appears that such a
proposal would yield $2 billion as well, subject to
rounding error, but would impact fewer than half
of all credit unions.
Only $22 million in additional revenue
would be raised by applying the corporate tax rate
to the net income of credit unions with assets
under $10 million. And only $120 million more
of net income would be taxed if all credit union
net income were taxed instead of the income of
the larger institutions. This is much lower than
the $200 million gain indicated by the JCT —
about one tenth as much, but the reasons for the
difference are not clear. While the estimate here
makes the “practical solution” more appealing
because of its negligible revenue loss, it still results
in a failure of neutrality for small credit unions
and other firms. Genuine tax neutrality would
require taxing all net income of all credit unions,
without regard to size.
Therefore, excluding taxation of small credit
unions simply because they are small is largely a
policy choice and would doubly compensate them
for being small. The income tax system already
accounts for size, taxing firms with lower income
at lower marginal tax rates. For example, firms
with taxable income less than $50 million pay a
15 percent rate. Over 35 percent of credit unions
would have faced this rate in 2003. For firms with
incomes from $50 million to $75 million, the
marginal tax rate is 25 percent, applied to income
over $50 million. Some 6.5 percent of all credit
unions would have faced this marginal tax rate in
2003. Adding in the 12.8 percent of credit unions
that had no net income in 2003, brings the total
to over half of all credit unions with a net income
of $75 million or less. Larger credit unions, at
least with incomes over $75 million, face marginal
tax rates from 34 percent to 39 percent. So most
credit unions would face lower tax rates than the
larger ones, even if all credit unions were subject
to the federal income tax, just as firms in other
industries are. Is there any reason why generally
small, low-income credit unions should pay no
federal income tax when small firms in other in-
dustries do?26
Neutrality would require that the tax rates of
all small firms, not just small credit unions, would
have to be lower. This could be accomplished by
creating a tax threshold for net income above zero.
Then all small firms could face a more favorable
tax rate, not just credit unions. For example a zero
tax bracket up to $50 million would exempt al-
most half of all credit unions and similarly
situated firms in the rest of the financial sector
and other industries as well. But of course this
scheme conflicts with the notion that all firms
with net income should pay taxes, even if they
face a different marginal tax rate because of size.
Another proposal that has arisen to correct
the unequal treatment of credit unions is to ex-
tend the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) to
credit unions. This would clearly provide more
accountability for credit unions to ensure that
they serve their communities, especially their low-
income individuals, in a manner proportionate to
their tax-exempt status. Banks currently are sub-
ject to extensive costs to insure that they are
meeting the credit demands of low-income bor-
rowers. Credit unions were excluded from these
provisions because of the presumption that they
must be serving such consumers. After all, their
charters are rooted in common bonds that seem to
25 See CBO (2003), proposal 21.
26 The effective or average tax rate of credit unions for all institutions would have been 33.7% of income if all were taxed and this
would rise to 33.97% if only larger institutions were taxed.
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assume that credit unions meet these require-
ments. But the evidence shows that credit unions
do not serve the poor to any greater extent than
banks. For example, most credit unions have an
occupational bond that requires members to be
employed, often in industries with relatively high
wage jobs.
Subjecting credit unions to CRA require-
ments would compound problematic and costly
regulations. Some bank regulators recently rede-
fined large banks to be those with assets larger
than $1 billion instead of $250 million. The rea-
son for this change in classification was simply to
reduce the set of large banks that are subject to
relatively higher regulatory costs related to CRA.
Small banks face a lower CRA regulatory burden
because they are deemed to be more community-
oriented in their competition for earning assets
and deposits and there is a regulatory interest in
holding down the regulatory burden on small
banks. While extending the more burdensome
CRA regulatory requirements to credit unions
would help level the playing field, it would be a
move away from regulatory efficiency. Credit
union officials have argued that the NCUA al-
ready examines credit unions on CRA-type
criteria even though credit unions are not explic-
itly covered by the act. Certainly extension of
CRA requirements to credit unions could await
reform of existing CRA requirements, which has
been on the regulatory agenda for several years.
VII. Conclusions
Bickley (2003) has emphasized that until
1951, savings and loan associations were not sub-
ject to the federal income tax. He suggests that it
was the changing financial environment that al-
tered the relationship of thrifts to their members
and caused the loss of their special tax treatment.
The implication is that the changing relationship
of credit unions to their members (changes in the
common bond and field of membership) will
ultimately lead to the end of the federal income
tax exemption of credit unions. Whether that
parallel is correct and predictive for credit union
taxation remains to be seen. Certainly renewed
calls for a new round of fundamental tax reform
are indicators that tax system fairness will be ad-
dressed. However, entrenched political support for
protecting the status quo for credit unions does
not bode well for quick tax equity reforms. Neu-
trality requires that similar firms be taxed equally.
But are credit unions the equal of banks or thrifts?
Many voters view their credit union as an exten-
sion of the employee benefits granted by their
employer or employee association, a service of a
social organization to which they belong, or per-
haps a community service related to a community
they live in. But when the bond that defines the
customer base extends to a community, like the
recent decision upholding the charter for the Los
Angeles County Credit Union, it is difficult to see
that the bond is more than any other corporate
business model defining a customer base.
Fiscal neutrality would require removing the
special tax treatment of credit unions. One sugges-
tion is that the special tax status for small
institutions be maintained while eliminating it for
larger credit unions that have equally broad poten-
tial customer bases, and that have commercial
operations, expenses and income comparable to
large banks and thrifts. This would seem to be a
compromise policy path. Large financial firms
would be subject to the same tax treatment, but
the proposal would protect the tax exemption of
small credit unions that adhere to their statutory
mission to provide services and benefits to people
of low economic status that may not be available
otherwise.
However, small credit unions are as likely to
be service facilities that are part of an employee
benefits package, and like other benefits are
efficiently produced. Tax reform has long recog-
nized that untaxed employee benefits result in an
inequity for the nation’s taxpayers and the direc-
tion of change is certain, if slow and halting.
Studies show that credit unions have not been
particularly effective in reaching audiences that
truly have limited access to loans, saving facilities
or other financial services offered by credit unions.
One of the greatest impediments to access is the
lack of a job or occupational connection, and
occupational credit unions do not overcome these
obstacles. Even associative or community-based
credit unions do not serve the jobless with loans
or other financial assistance. Few workers would
find their ability to obtain car or mortgage loans
or to find attractive saving options to be elimi-
nated by the absence of their credit union.
There are broad constituencies that would
resist tax reform, some of whom have considerable
weight politically. First are the leaders and em-
ployees of credit unions that would see the credit
union movement, purportedly and perhaps once,
as a social movement under threat. Second, many
populist groups would see imposing a higher cost
on credit unions as an attack on the poor or low-
income voters. Many credit unions are tied to
trade unions, and while trade unions are declining
and of relatively small numerical importance, they
often loom large as potent political forces when
acting as a voting block. Thus Treasury Secretary
Snow’s reluctance to see any issue in the reform of
taxation of credit unions, noted at the beginning
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of this paper, and the Congress’ haste to protect
the breakdown of limits on the membership of
credit unions are understandable from a political
perspective. They are not understandable from the
perspective of sound tax policy, however.
Tax reform of credit union income taxation is
a “no-brainer” when viewed in a broad tax neu-
trality context. It is also compelling when the
either the size of the revenue loss or the ineffec-
tiveness of the tax break for achieving any social
goal is considered. Reform would likely have to be
part of a more compelling tax reform package if it
is to ever be adopted. This is ironic because the tax
loss from credit unions is very large, about $2
billion per year currently and over $30 billion over
the next ten years. This study could not find any
net benefit to members that could not or would
not be available in the absence of tax-subsidized
credit unions. Most notably, the credit union
subsidy, by its very nature, has largely failed to
deliver financial services to low-income people.
The origins of the credit union tax exemption
reach back to the Great Depression, a time when
basic financial services were limited. Today, how-
ever, the financial services industry is highly
competitive, and its products and services are
accessible to all consumers. Credit union members
are just like other consumers who use banks in-
stead of credit unions. Credit unions are not
compelled by regulators to meet a higher standard
in the service of low- and moderate-income cus-
tomers, and there is no evidence that they do so
voluntarily. The $650 billion credit union indus-
try may have outgrown in size and scope its
original, tax-exempt mission.
From the perspectives of tax fairness and
sound tax policy, where the least economic distor-
tion and inefficiency is desired, taxation of credit
unions warrants prompt and genuine consider-
ation in any tax reform debate.
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Appendix: Interest and Dividend Rates at Federal and
State-Chartered Credit Unions
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Fed. State Fed. State Fed. State Fed. State Fed. State Fed. State Fed. State Fed. State
First mortgage loan 8.6% 8.6% 8.4% 8.4% 8.4% 8.4% 8.2% 8.1% 8.2% 8.2% 7.6% 7.4% 6.9% 6.8% 6.3% 6.2%
Other real estate 9.2 9.3 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 8.7 8.7 9.1 9.2 7.7 7.6 6.9 6.8 6.3 6.1
New vehicle loan 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.1 8.1 7.7 7.7 8.1 8.1 7.3 7.2 6.7 6.6 5.9 5.7
Used vehicle loan 8.3 8.1 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 8.9 8.9 9.2 9.3 8.5 8.4 7.6 7.7 7.0 6.6
Credit card 13.0 13.2 13.0 13.2 13.0 13.0 12.7 12.8 12.7 12.9 12.2 12.5 11.9 12.1 11.5 11.7
Regular shares 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.4 2.3 1.7 1.6 1.1 1.1
Share drafts 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.5
CD (1 year) 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.1 5.2 5.9 6.0 3.0 3.0 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.7
Money market shares 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.1 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.7 1.1 1.1
* Bold figures indicate that the sign of the difference in rates is consistent with a tax incidence effect: higher deposit rates and lower loan rates at federally chartered credit unions.
